Kamis, 20 Mei 2010

SO WHAT’S YOUR DIFFERENTIATION BET?

Many companies commit the mistake of equating ‘differentiation’ purely with ‘providing better quality’. There’s much more you can do with this thrilling strategy of differentiation.

Walk into the International Supermarket and Museum in Naples, New York, and you’ll learn how to pay your humblest tributes to “failed products”. About 60,000 products that failed in US supermarkets find a place in the museum. Hear out their names – Clairol’s Touch of Yogurt shampoo, Gerber Products baby food, Captain Cat Cat-Litter Deodorant, Gorilla Balls (a vitamin-rich candy), Yogurt Face and Body Powder, Gimme Cucumber hair conditioner, Soaps for Lovers, Moonshine aftershave, Buffalo Chip chocolate cookies, Batman Crazy foam, Hagar the horrible Cola, Kickapoo Joy Juice, Sudden Soda, and many more. Actually, how many of them have you heard of? None, because their ‘formulae’ – as in branding mix – failed to hit home their relative superiority to consumers. They were undifferentiated and therefore undervalued by the “quick to form a perception” consumer market. They were simply “commodities”. As Jack Trout writes in his book ‘Differentiate or Die’: “While categories are expanding thanks to the law of division, something sinister is happening. More and more of these categories are sliding into commoditisation. In other words, fewer and fewer of the brands in these categories are well differentiated. In people’s minds, they are there, but that’s about all!”

But then, what is differentiation (as opposed to selling the cheapest products – or price leadership)? Differentiation is simply ensuring that your prospective consumers are convinced that your product is superior relative to competitors. Nobel Prize winning theorists have proven that even if your products are in reality ‘not’ superior, as long as the consumers are convinced about the same, you’ve done your job and hit bull’s eye! But then again, what factor do you differentiate on? Obviously quality, right? Wrong! Or rather, not necessarily. While companies globally make the mistake of equating differentiation with ‘providing better quality’, the fact is that differentiation can be as successfully attempted on certain other key parameters. Here’s a primer with my most loved examples.

THE FIRST DIFFERENTIATOR – SERVICE
Every one who wishes to fly to London wants to be aboard the Virgin Atlantic. Not that it has more comfortable seats, not even that it has better planes and so flies faster; the reason is simple – unlike competitors, it has set itself apart as a brand that delivers superior “service”– 30,000 feet in the air. Little touches prove that – on a Virgin flight, underneath the salt and pepper shakers, modeled on mini-airplanes, you’ll find the words “Pinched from Virgin Atlantic.” The butter knife is engraved with the words “stainless steal”. And there’s always a bar in the upper class cabin so that its travellers can chat and socialise. The airline was the first to really stretch the grade of what is called service in air to the next yard. It was the first to put in seat-back televisions, and serve ice-creams while mid-flight. “We did everything we could to lighten the mood and the experience. Twenty-five years later, the airline retains that very same sense of fun and the true ability to surprise and make people smile,” says Sir Richard Branson, Chairman of Virgin Group of companies.

And if you’ve ever heard of a company named Maruti Suzuki, you’ll know very well that the world buys Maruti cars purely on the basis of the geographic expanse of Maruti’s service outlets, rather than the design of its cars. That’s differentiation for you!

THE SECOND DIFFERENTIATOR – STYLE
For the world Nokia stands out for quality; truth is, that’s not the truth! As per the most recent Gartner study (May 2010), Nokia commands 36.4% of the world’s mobile device market share, while its next closest competitor is Samsung at 20.6% and the third is LG, with 8.6% global share. In India, Nokia fares better. As per the most recent ORG survey made public, Nokia rules with 59.5%, Sony Ericsson comes second with 8.1%, while Samsung is third with 7%. Now here’s the most recent shocker of 2010 for you – according the 2010 Wireless Traditional Mobile Phone Global Evaluation Study by J.D. Power and Associates, LG was ranked number one by customers in terms of “overall wireless customer satisfaction amongst all traditional handset brands”. This is the fifth year that LG has won the crown since 2003. Nokia was #7! The secret is, Nokia knows mobile consumers love newer designs, newer models, newer rehashes of the same old ‘stuff’, and Nokia rules on that differentiation: style!

Apple, a name which you often hear being associated with innovation, or technology for that matter is again one clever differentiator. Steve Jobs is cleverer. His company didn’t invent the portable music player, or the first laptop, or even the first smartphone. He only followed, and followed better! His iPod, iMac, iPhone have become bestsellers, but were never the ones which innovated technology. Jobs simply gave the products a better appearance, a better interface, a better style. In short he gave it a better overall design. That’s a style differentiator for you.

THE THIRD DIFFERENTIATOR – TECHNOLOGY
How many of you know whether Intel chips are faster or AMD? The fact is, AMD Athlon chips have even beaten Intel’s comparable chips in lab tests – and vice versa too. But right from the start, Andy Grove, the former Chairman of Intel (who wrote: Only the Paranoid Survive) realised that it didn’t matter what was true, it mattered what consumers believed. Through perceptionbuilding exercises, Grove managed to keep consumers convinced that Intel’s processors were technologically faster and superior than those of AMD. Since 1971, it has introduced 662 “unique” versions of the microprocessor; AMD has introduced just 79 versions since 1975! Intel has changed its logo four times; AMD has done it just once. Everyone wonders now it’s “Intel Inside”; how many ask if it’s “AMD Inside”? Nobody! For 2009, research firm iSuppli puts Intel’s share in the PC market at 80.6% (as opposed to AMD’s 12.1%), while IDC research puts Intel’s share at 80.5% (as opposed to AMD’s 14.4%). Even Fedex differentiated using technology rather than just service, where they were the first ones to provide customers with an online package tracking system.

AND OF COURSE – QUALITY
After the setback caused to the Toyota brand post 8.4 million recalls in the beginning of 2010, none would have given the Japanese automaker a chance in the 2010 J.D. Power and Associates’ Vehicle Dependability Study, which was released in March this year. But Toyota’s longstanding belief in quality being a differentiator paid off. The study, after measuring and analysing drivers’ experiences after three years of vehicle ownership, gave Toyota the top spot in four segments – more than any other auto brand. While the Toyota Prius topped the list of the Most Dependable Compact, Toyota Sequoia was the Most Dependable Large MUV, Toyota Tundra was the Most Dependable Large Pickup and Toyota Highlander the Most Dependable Midsize MUV. You want to learn what quality differentiation is? Ask Toyota, which manages it despite multi-million recalls.

AND IF NOTHING WORKS – BRAND RECALL
What do you do when your product cannot be differentiated on any factor? Then go for the simple and straightforward strategy of brand recall. Bombard the consumer ad nauseum with advertisements. He’ll hate you – yet, he’ll buy your product. Brand recall is too powerful. Be the Nike, which sells more not because it’s superior, but simply because it advertises much more than its counterparts like Adidas, Puma, Reebok, Converse, K-Swiss, Skechers, et al. Be the Procter & Gamble, Unilever, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola – each spend more than $2 billion each in advertising – where all you see in their ads are either celebrities or spanking humour (or both). Well, now you know why your wife hates you, yet still can’t let go of you :-)

Selasa, 18 Mei 2010

Apple, Adobe, and Openness: Let's Get Real



There's a huge debate online about who's "right" between Apple and Adobe in the dispute over allowing Flash on the iPhone. Both companies portray their actions as protection of users and developers, but in reality what they're both protecting is their profits. There's nothing wrong with doing that -- it's what companies are supposed to do. But the only truly innocent victims in this dispute are the people trapped between Adobe and Apple.


Why Apple really doesn't want Flash on iPhone

Steve Jobs outlined his case against Flash in a recent open letter. His arguments boiled down to this:

Flash is proprietary.
H.264 video is better than Flash video.
There are lots of games on iPhone, so you won't miss the Flash ones.
Flash is insecure.
Flash makes Macs crash.
Flash is slow and reduces battery life.
Flash doesn't work well with touchscreen technology.
As an independent development layer, Flash reduces Apple's ability to innovate.

I'm not going to evaluate each of those claims; others have done a good job of that already. But none of Jobs' points except the last one explains all of Apple's actions. Apple has consistently banned not just Flash but almost all independent platforms, including Java, QT, and Palm OS emulators. One of the most poignant examples I've run across recently is Runtime Revolution, which is basically Hypercard brought into the modern era. It's a nifty tool for making prototypes and interactive media products, and its creator had been heavily committed to iPhone as a development target, encouraged by Steve Jobs' public statement that a third party developer could create a Hypercard-like product for iPhone. But Runtime Revolution's CEO killed the iPhone project last week because Apple won't allow the product to run; his story is posted here (link).

The bottom line: Apple just doesn't like other platforms.

I think Apple is sincere when it says it views these platforms as a potential barrier to innovation. But I don't think that's the whole story. Independent platforms also make it easy for a successful developer to port its software to other platforms, like Android or Symbian. This cross-platform porting is something that Apple fears because it's what allowed Windows to catch up with Macintosh.

Here's a list of some major PC software products. Do you know what they all have in common?

Photoshop
Word
Myst
Excel
FileMaker
PostScript
PowerPoint
Illustrator

The answer: They were first successful on Apple systems, and only later took off in the PC world.

I was working at Apple when this process happened, and I can tell you that it was searing. Apple had invested countless hours and dollars marketing those products as prominent reasons to buy Macs, and then we saw that investment turned against us when the apps were made available on Windows.

Do you think Steve Jobs has forgotten that experience? Look how he started the open letter on Flash:

"Apple has a long relationship with Adobe. In fact, we met Adobe's founders when they were in their proverbial garage. Apple was their first big customer, adopting their Postscript language for our new Laserwriter printer. Apple invested in Adobe and owned around 20% of the company for many years. The two companies worked closely together to pioneer desktop publishing and there were many good times. Since that golden era, the companies have grown apart."

Can you hear the resentment? It reminds me of Bill Cosby quoting his dad: "I brought you into this world, and I can take you out." I think some of the key folks at Apple remember being "betrayed" by "their" developers, and they are determined never to leave themselves vulnerable to that again. I believe it's Apple's policy to keep iPhone and iPad developers as closely tied to the platform as possible, and to make it as hard as possible for them to move their products elsewhere. I think that's the core reason why Apple won't permit Flash, or any other third party platform, to run on iPhone.

If I were still working at Apple, I would probably do the same thing. That's not to say I like the policy, because it restricts customer choice and developer flexibility. But I understand the business logic behind it, and the depth of feeling Apple folks have on this issue. To Apple this isn't just about innovation, it's about business survival.

I just wish Apple had been more specific about what was allowed and not allowed on its platform. At times the rules seem very arbitrary. For example, Runtime Revolution is banned from iPhone, but a game creation environment called Game Salad says it is allowed (link). The company claims Apple privately promised that it could continue to run, but won't say what it did to get Apple's permission. Runtime Revolution thought it was following the rules too. A platform vendor is responsible for articulating exactly what developers will and will not be permitted to do, before they invest time and money. Apple was at best sloppy about delivering that information, and at worst it changed the rules in the middle of the game.


Adobe's Flash agenda

So we have Apple trying to keep developers on the farm, barefoot and pregnant. Does that make Adobe the liberator, throwing open the gates and setting developers free? Maybe, but only to the extent that it serves Adobe's own interests.

If you want to understand Adobe's agenda for Flash, you have to look back to 2006, when Adobe bought Macromedia. Just after the acquisition, Adobe CEO Bruce Chizen gave a very interesting interview in which he discussed Adobe's plans for Flash and related technologies (link):

Buying Flash "enables us to create an 'engagement platform.' Think of it as a layer or a vehicle in which anybody can present information that could be engaged with in an interactive, compelling, reliable, relatively secure way -- across all kinds of devices, all kinds of operating systems....If we execute appropriately we will be the engagement platform, or the layer, on top of anything that has an LCD display, any computing device -- everything from a refrigerator to an automobile to a video game to a computer to a mobile phone."

In other words, Flash becomes the developer platform, and the underlying OS is transformed into commodity plumbing. Adobe's focus at the time was on competing with Microsoft (the article mentions Apple only in passing and Google not at all), but when you declare war on one OS, you declare war on them all.

I don't think you can blame Apple for feeling threatened by this. (Or Google, for that matter, which has been running its own behind the scenes war against Flash by promoting HTML 5.)

I thought it was a brilliant strategy when Adobe announced it. Unfortunately, Adobe's execution hasn't matched its rhetoric. Four years ago, Chizen said Adobe would quickly merge Flash and Acrobat into a runtime environment that would own the next generation of applications. If Adobe had moved quickly, it might have made its platform into a contender, and the software market might look a lot different today. But the new platform, called Adobe Air, was very slow to come to market, and was focused on PCs rather than mobile devices. Today it has very little developer momentum.

Adobe spun its wheels in the mobile market in particular. It insisted on charging for the mobile Flash runtime for a long time, even though it knew that free runtimes are the key to adoption. And then much of the Adobe mobile team was fired in a series of layoffs starting at the end of 2008. Adobe had hired a lot of mobile industry veterans, and by firing them Adobe created the impression in the mobile industry that it was not serious about mobile. There's a very good discussion of some of Adobe's other mobile challenges here.

Fast forward a year and a half from those firings, and Apple has completely seized the initiative with mobile developers. Now Adobe is fighting a defensive battle just to keep Flash relevant.

There's an old quote attributed to Napoleon, "If you start to take Vienna, take Vienna." Adobe failed to take Vienna. Note to other tech companies: Don't declare your intention to take over the world; do it first and explain later. (By the way, this explains both Apple's strategy and Chinese foreign policy, but I digress.)

Because of this history, I find it hard to feel a lot of sympathy for the troubles that Flash is having. I also find it a bit disingenuous when Adobe says that it's fighting for a "multiplatform" world (link), when the company has said previously that it really wants a single platform, led by Adobe, that runs on top of multiple operating systems.

I'm also amused by Adobe's statements that it has always been a proponent of open standards. Adobe cofounders John Warnock and Chuck Geschke wrote:

"That, certainly, was what we learned as we launched PostScript® and PDF, two early and powerful software solutions that work across platforms. We openly published the specifications for both, thus inviting both use and competition. In the early days, PostScript attracted 72 clone makers, but we held onto our market leadership by out-innovating the pack."

Actually, Adobe held onto its leadership in part by building secret, proprietary extensions to PostScript and tying its paid products to them. In an example I saw personally, Adobe's secret APIs in PostScript enabled it to create higher-quality fonts that looked better and ran more efficiently than competitors. As a PostScript developer you were welcome to work with Adobe's low-quality font technology, but Adobe refused to allow any developer to access its proprietary high-quality APIs.

Sounds like something Apple would do, doesn't it?


The real battle

So the real situation around Flash is that Apple won't permit most other platforms on iPhone (no matter how innocuous they are) because it thinks they threaten its survival, while Adobe wants its platform on iPhone so it can set a de facto standard and make money from it. Neither company is really focused on protecting developers or users as its main goal; they are fighting over who gets to use developers to make money.

Unfortunately for developers, this situation makes it more and more likely that the mobile world will continue to be split into incompatible platforms, forcing them to rewrite their programs multiple times in order to reach the broadest group of customers. Theoretically, the mobile browser could become the grand unifier of mobile development, and as I have said before I wish it would (venture capitalist Eric Ver Ploeg makes the case for it here). Unfortunately, the development of those standards has been incredibly slow and political, and after watching that process for years, it's becoming harder and harder to convince myself that it'll ever speed up. I hope it does, but I suspect that one reason Apple's willing to support web standards is because it believes it can dramatically out-innovate them.

In the meantime, Apple and Adobe will continue to duke it out. If Adobe could get customers and developers to boycott Apple products, I guess Apple might be forced to back down. Or Adobe might convince the government to charge Apple with noncompetitive behavior. But I think neither of those is likely to happen. The most likely outcome is that Apple will hold the line against Flash, Adobe will try to run Flash on every other mobile platform, we'll get a lot more posturing from both companies -- and a lot of websites will get rich running Adobe's anti-Apple ads.

Rabu, 28 April 2010

Quick thoughts on Palm and HP

It could have been worse. A lot worse.

Many of the companies rumored to be looking at Palm would have bought it mostly for the patents or the brand, and tossed aside everything else. But I think there's a good chance that HP bought the company to keep running it. HP has a long history of activity in the mobile devices market, but hasn't had a lot of knockout success there lately, other than in notebook computers. Palm makes it a player again, or at least potentially a player.

The press release makes it sound like HP was especially interested in the software side of Palm rather than the hardware. WebOS was mentioned six times (compared to one mention of Pre), and Todd Bradley, EVP of the Personal Systems group at HP, was quoted in the press release as saying, "Palm's innovative operating system provides an ideal platform to expand HP’s mobility strategy and create a unique HP experience spanning multiple mobile connected devices."

Sure sounds to me like they're planning to deploy the OS across different classes of devices. And tablets were reportedly mentioned specifically in the press conference after the deal was announced.

So overall, I think Palm users and developers should feel good about the deal. Obviously, everything will depend on execution. But at least the company's not being immediately dismantled, which could easily have happened.

Here are some other thoughts on the deal:

Upside for Palm device sales. With HP's huge sales infrastructure, the Pre can move quickly into a lot of interesting places Palm couldn't easily reach -- especially corporate sales, more international markets, and more operator deals.

Ominous news for Microsoft. Between the gains for Android and the Apple-driven trend toward mobile companies owning their own platforms, the market space for Microsoft's mobile software continues to shrink. But more important than that, HP is the number one Windows vendor, and it now owns its own operating system. That's not an immediate crisis for Microsoft, but it should keep someone there awake at night.

Can the old dog HP learn new tricks? Historically, HP has been pretty close to inept in two areas that Palm knows how to run: Managing a consumer developer community, and creating a great user experience by combining hardware and software. If HP is wise, it will keep the Palm teams intact and let them gradually spread those skills to the rest of the company. On the other hand, if HP tries to "help" the Palm folks execute, it will almost certainly drown them in process and bureaucracy.

What is HP's goal in personal systems? The thing that surprises me most about the Palm purchase is that the rumor mill in Silicon Valley said HP was moving away from differentiation in PCs. The company has laid off many of the Apple refugees who had come in to help run the PC business, and the quirky advertising seems to have faded into the background. Supposedly, HP was much more interested in emulating Acer than Apple in PCs. But the Palm deal positions HP as a much more direct competitor to Apple.

Maybe HP sees mobile as a different marketplace, where investment and innovation can pay off better.

PS: I won't even get into the irony of former Palm CEO Todd Bradley now controlling the company again. Let's just say Silicon Valley is a very small place.

Rabu, 21 April 2010

SHOW US YOUR FACES, DEAR CEOs!

CEOs come in many flavours. While some are plain vanilla, others are charismatic. While some fail, others redefine success. And while some hide, others believe in the fact that “seeing is believing”. Which one are you?

Undercurrents of controversies have always chaperoned the question: Should a CEO’s face represent the company and vice-versa? The answer is, yes – for good or for worse! That black and white photograph of Henry Ford, standing next to the ancient Model-T will always represent what Ford Motors was during its glorious heydays. Bill Gates will always be the representative of the might of Microsoft, all across the world, despite his giving away all his executive powers. Carly Fiorina will remain in the memories of thousands, for having been the loud public CEO, who created the much criticised HP-Compaq giant (the world’s largest IT company today). And whose face do you recall when you think of Dell Computers?

Much has been written and discussed about the Fed’s unceremonious firing of Rick Wagoner (the-then CEO & Chairman of General Motor Co.) in March last year, after he came under heavy criticism for allowing GM to bloat beyond logical dimensions, thereby paving way for $82 billion in losses since he took over as its CEO in June 2000. The Harvard Alumnus scrapped the EV1 electric- car program and diverted resources away from hybrids (his biggest mistakes as he confesses), but had built enough credibility to carry all shame on his strong shoulders. And to give what’s due to him, he became the symbol of the imperial auto manufacturing American nation called GM, so much so, that the Fed practically had to ask him to step down in lieu of further aid to GM. Wagoner represented brawns; the man who had worked for 32 years at GM, ever since he earned an MBA degree, represented GM. [For the critics, under Wagoner, GM had more cars that exceeded 30 miles-per-gallon than any other automaker in the world!]

To many, Akio Toyoda, the President of Toyota Motor Co., represents nothing but a meteoroid. Toyota surpassed GM in 2009, to become the world’s largest producer of automobiles for just a year before it got off to the worst possible start to 2010. To many more, he still cuts that sorry figure who apologised before the US Congress for his act of recalling 8 million vehicles this year, while taking home a $16.4 million slap. To most, the only picture that comes to mind when you imagine what Toyota is, is its three ellipsical logo. Toyoda was a character unknown to the world; no doubt, even when he testified how the company was committing to recalls in all good faith, he failed. You don’t believe a CEO whom you’ve never seen before – neither as a customer, nor as a Senator!

“If you get your face and your name out there enough, people will start to recognise you,” says this flamboyant CEO of over 200 branded companies. Over the years, he has launched costumes to amuse his business partners, customers and the media. He has thrown himself off tall buildings, hung off bridges and taken deep sea dives – all to grab attention. He had the gall to drive a tank into Times Square and fire at the Coke signboard to launch the challenge against the big cola maker. His bet – Virgin Cola. The CEO – Richard Branson, who’s flamboyant smile represents his group of over 200 companies – the Virgin Group. “A young girl once came up to me and told me I could be famous because I looked just like Richard Branson,” says he. That’s the power of being a CEO brand.

Larry Ellison, the highest paid CEO of 2009 is the poster boy of Oracle. Not easy to become a recognised face amongst the masses, especially when your company has a B2B business structure, but Ellison, born out of wedlock to a 19-year-old Jewish mother, had managed his public image quite well, despite having been married four times! He started Oracle in 1977 (the same year when Wagoner joined GM), investing $1,400 of his own money. Today, it is worth $131 billion on the bourses, and Ellison is the sixth richest man in the world. Ellison has suffered a series of personal mishaps, but has managed to cover it up well, for the sake of his corporation, which has grown in leaps by the years. Today, he is known for his extravagant lifestyle, his $200 million real estate, his fleet of exotic cars and his personal aircrafts. What he is known for most widely is for being the poster CEO of Oracle.

Jeffrey Immelt is another name that has earned a huge critique following –for converting GE into more of an Automated Teller Machine that a manufacturing giant (close to 50% of GE’s 2009 revenues came from GE Capital Services). The slowdown hit it hard, washing away close to $100 billion of its Mcap. It wasn’t an easy task to become the GE ambassador to the world, but Immelt, minus all his shareholder wealth destroying acts, has done his bit to play it to the galleries. Some blame him, some praise him, but everyone knows him.

Larry Ellison’s good friend Steve Jobs is no different. From being the brand ambassador at the launch of every iconic Apple product to fi ring employees at will, his fame has grown over time, at manifold the rate at which he has lost pounds. If it’s not Steve, it’s not Apple!

The list of CEOs who have led from the front, both in the boardrooms and outside in the open isn’t short. From Warren Edward Buffett (of Berkshire Hathaway) to Rupert Murdoch (of News Corporation), from Larry Page and Sergey Brin (who are known for their product Google, unlike the founders of Orkut, LinkedIn and Twitter) to Mark Zuckerber (the 24 year-lad founder and CEO of Facebook and the youngest selfmade billionaire in the world), from Indra Nooyi (“The Iron Woman” who is not just the most powerful woman in the world on many lists, but also one who has transformed PepsiCo’s portfolio, and publicly so, leading the aggressive expansion of PepsiCo into nations like Brazil, Russia, India and China; not many would recall who CocaCola’s CEO is!), the list is long.

Think about it, American CEOs, you’ll know a dime a dozen. But if I were to ask you to name a few Japanese CEOs, apart from Akio Morita (and perhaps Toyoda too), you would know none. Is that the reason why for the past many years, Japan is suffering from a debilitating recession? I don’t have the answer to that, but what I can surely say is that Japan lacks CEOs not only at the corporate level, but even at the country level (for example, the US has Obama) who would be able to jumpstart the economic growth by individually becoming the face of change. Clearly, the term ‘leading from the front’ was not made for no reason. on. 4Ps

Minggu, 18 April 2010

Lessons From the Fall of Palm

What went wrong?

Palm is now apparently prepping itself for a remainder sale, or new sugar daddy, or some other sort of deal that will change its current trajectory. I wish them well, and I hope they can remain independent and go on to accomplish great things in the future. But whatever happens, it's clear that the current incarnation of Palm has failed. Almost everyone I talk to in Silicon Valley is already speaking of the company in the past tense.

Most of the comments I've seen online blame the company's failure on the high marketing costs associated with selling hardware:

--Ed Snyder, an analyst with Charter Equity Research, told the New York Times: “They poured all their resources into developing a killer product. But they didn’t have the resources left to go to market.” (link)

--Engadget called Palm "a company that has more talent, history, and bright ideas than it has cash and customers." (link)

--Charlie Wolf of Needham & Company told Bloomberg: "It can't get scale. It doesn't have the resources to market the Palm OS and the Pre in a way that would break through the noise." (link)

--Even Palm CEO Jon Rubinstein blamed the problem on marketing challenges: "Palm webOS is recognized as a groundbreaking platform that enables one of the best smartphone experiences available today....However, driving broad consumer adoption of Palm products is taking longer than we anticipated." (link)

The quotes reflect the tech industry's stereotypical view of hardware businesses: They require huge marketing budgets, making them incredibly high-risk, high-cost investments. That's why you see thousands of software startups in Silicon Valley and only a handful of hardware ones.

I think that's nuts. Hardware companies like Pure Digital (maker of the Flip camera) succeeded with virtually no marketing budget. Why? Because they made appealing products that filled a particular customer need. If you do that, hardware is easy to market virally. I think the lesson from Palm's failure isn't "making hardware is dangerous," it's "lack of focus in a small hardware company is dangerous."

I don't want to turn this post into an anti-Palm diatribe. As I said, I hope they survive, and I have enormous respect for the people who work there. But in the spirit of helping everyone learn from Palm's situation, here are the five lessons I think we should all take away from Palm's struggles:


1. Understand what problem you're solving. I asked this question when the Pre was first announced, and I'll ask it again now: What compelling problem does the Pre solve for what customer? (link) It's easy to answer that for successful devices:

--BlackBerry = great e-mail on the go for mobile professionals

--iPhone = the best entertainment and browsing on the go (later extended to include apps)

--Flip = the easiest way to capture video and share it online

What's the short pitch for Pre? Go check the Palm website. As of April 18, it featured three different positionings right on the front page: "Social networking at its best," "Advanced 3D games," and "Work smarter, stay connected." So it's a business / social networking / gaming tool. For all of those millions of people who want to do serious business, 3D games, and Facebook posts all at once.

This isn't a recent problem. At the time of the Pre announcement, Palm advocates described it as a device for people who want better e-mail than the iPhone and better entertainment than the BlackBerry. The implication was that there's a big center to the smartphone market that's frustrated by the lack of a keyboard on an iPhone and the lack of a music player on BlackBerry. Re-read Jon Rubinstein's quote above: "webOS is recognized as a groundbreaking platform that enables one of the best smartphone experiences available today." The assumption there is that millions of customers are looking to buy a "smartphone experience," as opposed to a tool that solves a particular problem.

If that unsatisfied center existed, Pre would have sold like hotcakes.


2. Take care of your friends. When Elevation Partners took control of Palm, the company wasn't just a famous brand. It also had a fairly large base of loyal customers and developers who had stuck with the Treo through a lot of angst and adversity. The new Palm did very little to keep those people loyal. The developers weren't given any way to bridge their existing applications to the new OS. Faced with starting over on webOS or starting over on the much larger iPhone base, guess what they chose. And Palm, which once prided itself on simplicity, made the Treo to Pre migration process into the sort of marathon experience that we used to tease Microsoft about. Here are some of the instructions from Palm's own website (link):

Decide where you want to move your Calendar/Contacts

The Data Transfer Assistant moves your info out of the desktop organizer and onto your phone. From there, your phone sends the data to the web account of your choice.

Your choices: Google, Microsoft Exchange, or Yahoo!.
Need help deciding where your info should go?

Skip this step if you already have an online account where you want to move the info from your old desktop organizer.
Create an account for one of these web services:
Google

1. Go to Google.com: Create a Google account and set up a new account.
2. If you've never used Google Calendar, you'll need to sign in at least one time before proceeding. Go to google.com/calendar, and follow the login & activation steps until you see your calendar.

Microsoft Exchange for corporate users

Ask your IT Helpdesk for these four pieces of information.

* Incoming mail server name
* Domain name (if it's different from your incoming mail server name)
* Exchange username
* Exchange password

Yahoo! Calendar & Contacts

Contacts are transferred from Yahoo.com to the phone, but not from phone to Yahoo!

1. Go to Yahoo.com: Sign up for Yahoo! and create a new account.

Or back up your info to your online Palm profile

Ready to go - you already created an account when you set up your phone.

Set up the account on your phone

After creating an online account, add it to your phone. This ensures that your info moves correctly to the account.

1. On your phone, open Contacts.
2. Open the application menu and tap Preferences & Accounts.
3. Tap Add An Account and select the account you created above.
4. Enter the username and password for that account.

Sync your old device one last time

Skip this step if you do not have a previous Palm device.

To make sure you have the most up-to-date version of your info in Palm Desktop or standalone Outlook, synchronize your previous Palm device and your computer one last time.

Export your info using the Data Transfer Assistant

For fastest results, turn on Wi-Fi (if available) and plug in the charger before proceeding.

Download the tool: Data_Transfer_Assistant_1e.exe

After the download is complete, double-click Data_Transfer_Assistant_1e.exe in the location on your computer where you downloaded it.
Follow the onscreen instructions.
Note: When you connect the phone to your computer, some applications may launch automatically, moving the Data Transfer Assistant to the background. To return the Data Transfer Assistant to the foreground, click the Data Transfer Assistant icon on your computer's taskbar....

You can find some more discussion here.

This in itself wasn't a disaster. Any company has to set priorities, and Palm just didn't make the links to its legacy customers and developers a priority. But it meant Palm couldn't draw on a pool of friends to help it get sales off to a quick start. That put even more pressure on Pre to be a knockout hit from day one.


3. Move faster and slower. After the Elevation deal, Palm went through a very strange management transition. Jon Rubinstein was installed as Chairman and head of product development, Ed Colligan remained as CEO (so he was Jon's employee and boss at the same time), and Jeff Hawkins was supposed to remain as product guru. Palm said at the time that Jon would be the execution person and Jeff the visionary. "The combination of those two guys is one of the most dynamic... combinations on the planet," Palm said. Yeah, right. The real process was a creeping reorganization in which Rubinstein replaced the old Palm executive team in stages. I think Palm would have been better off with a single quick transition in which the new team was put in place all at once and given time to coalesce.

But if Palm moved too slowly on organizational change, it probably moved too quickly on product shipment. The Pre shipped without a finished development environment, frustrating the developers who were most motivated to create interesting software on it. And it had an OS that hadn't been tuned properly for performance, so even its most enthusiastic users had to apologize for its lack of responsiveness. Although there was a lot of pressure on Palm at the time to ship, in retrospect the company would have been far, far better off if it had waited a few more months and shipped a product that delivered a great user and developer experience.


4. What you do, do well. The old Palm's "zen" design principles said: "Find a problem, find the simplest solution, punt the rest." It was an appliance design philosophy translated into computing. The new Palm tried to boil the ocean. Its ambition to create a smartphone platform superior to iPhone forced it to compete on a very broad range of fronts, everything from OS to SDK to app store to hardware. Inevitably, Palm wasn't able to execute equally well in all areas, and some of the Pre's features were compromised due to lack of resources. Apple can get away with a flawed version one product because it has the financial resources to go back and fix its mistakes. Which brings me to the fifth lesson...


5. You're not Apple. Trying to beat Apple head-on is a rich man's game, the computing equivalent of fighting a land war in Asia. There are effective ways to compete with Apple on a budget, but they all involve avoiding or neutralizing its strengths, and targeting segments or tactics that Apple can't or won't pursue. Instead, Palm attacked head on. I'm picturing that Warner Brothers cartoon where Black Knight Yosemite Sam charges at full speed into the wall of a castle and bounces off flat as a pancake (link).


What it means for the rest of us

You'll notice that I didn't say anything about Palm's bizarre ads featuring a Borg hive queen (here and here). That's because they were a symptom, not a cause. When your product is right, the message will be simple and you won't need creepy ads to stand out. Often you won't need ads at all.

The mistakes highlighted by Palm are common in the tech industry. Here's what I think we should do about them:

--I know there are device companies out there right now where the employees are whispering to each other, "we've committed to shipping on a certain date, but the product won't really be ready." You know who you are. Don't let your company pull a Pre; speak up. If nothing else works, print this post and send it to your boss. The Board of Directors might fire you if you delay the launch, but they definitely will fire you if the product fails.

--I frequently talk with companies that are creating bundles of technologies rather than coherent solutions to problems (anybody want to buy a Verizon Droid? link). Ask yourself, who is my customer, and am I solving a problem that they care about deeply?

--I know investors who say, "I'll never touch hardware, it's too risky." Understand that you're missing opportunities where you could invest with a higher return, because valuations aren't being bid up by competing investors. The fault, dear investor, is not in our product category, but in our execution.


That's my take. What do you think? Where did Palm go wrong (if at all), and what do you think the lessons are for other companies?

Rabu, 07 April 2010

FIRST LOSER’S ADVANTAGE

EVERYBODY TOLD US WHY HAVING THE FIRST MOVERS’ ADVANTAGE WAS MOST CRITICAL FOR SUCCESS. THEY WERE ALL WRONG!

The global business acumen is populated with a multitude of mildewed and hollow adages that fail to equip companies with knowledge to reap extraordinary benefits; First Movers’ Advantage is one such hogwash. Over decades, there have been entrepreneurs who have been washed away by this cliché, that once promised them a blue ocean. And most often than not, they ended up wasting truckloads of dollars in inventing the next unimaginable business bet, and building the platform for the late coming slumber-jacks, who eventually walked away with all the goods – the revenues, the profits, and in most cases, even the innovator’s future!

Henry Ford, who himself was a first mover (having pioneered the automobile), had once proclaimed, “I believe that the best strategy for the first per son is to be second!” He was right. Today, Ford Motor Company, his brainchild has not only slipped from being the world leader in automobiles, which it was some decades back (Toyota, GM & Volkswagen with respective market shares of 13.7%, 12.2% & 9.5% are the top three as per the December 2009 World Motor Vehicle Production OICA Survey), but has also become the champion of automobile recalls, globally! If you thought that the $16.4 million fine imposed on the late-mover Toyota Motor Co. by the US government, following its monstrous recall of 8 million vehicles since January 2010 was a fair punishment, how much would you recommend for the first mover Ford, which in 2008 recalled 14.1 million vehicles, after recalling 8 million in 1996?

What’s common between Vivola, Erwise, Midas and Mosaic? All four, individually claimed that they created the browser market. Their hard work translated into a business idea for late-mover Bill Gates. As of February 2010, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer commanded a 65% control over the global browser market (data by Janco Associates Inc.).

Being the first to stake a claim on a new territory doesn’t ensure sustainability. Sadly, it doesn’t even guarantee advantages as was originally believed. Take the case of the lesser known Prodigy Communications. It was an early bird in the business of online connections, which it entered in 1984, along with huge brand names to guarantee it success: there was IBM leading technology for its operations, Sears Roebuck heading its online retail and CBS was roped in for news coverage and selling of ad-space. Twelve years later, it was sold to a private investor group for just $250 million. Similar was the case with the Graphical User Interface, which was developed by the Xerox Corporation at their Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) in the 1970s. Steve Jobs, co-founder of Apple Computers, visited PARC in 1979 and was impressed by the Xerox Alto, the first computer with a graphical user interface feature. He offered Xerox a chance to invest $1 million in Apple pre-IPO stock, in lieu of two visits to PARC with his engineers. Today, none remember that the Xerox Alto was the first computer with a GUI; for the world, it is the Apple Lisa, which simply “copied” the technology which Jobs saw at Xerox. It’s interesting how one man can prove the case for the late movers so well. Steve Jobs didn’t invent the portable music player, or the first laptop, or even the first smartphone. He only followed, and followed right! His iPod, iMac, iPhone have become bestsellers.

There are many examples of how the first mover lot has been one which has been long forgotten. Names like King Kullen Grocery Inc. (which pioneered supermarkets in America in 1884), Minnetonka (which produced the world’s first liquid soap), Ampex (maker of the first VCRs, which lived for just two decades), Chux (from J&J, which was the first disposable diaper brand), Micro Instrumentation & Telemetry Systems (which pioneered personal computing with the Altair), Visicalc (the first desktop spreadsheet program), Atari (which brought to market the first video game), Dumont (which led the way in selling television sets), and many more, have been relegated to the dust-laden history books. And to talk about the new age champions, they are all those which learnt from the mistakes of the early birds.

Walmart was not the pioneer of retail. Excel was not the first spreadsheet to hit desktops. Commercial aircraft were not the brainchild of Boeing or Airbus. Neither did Disney start a theme-based park, nor was Starbucks the first to sell gourmet coffee. It’s true: they were not the first, they had learnt well and did better!

The criticism is supported well by research too. Researchers DavidMontgomery (Stanford University) and Marvin Lieberman (University of California), in their paper titled ‘First Mover Advantages...’ stated that the ability “to ‘free ride’ on first-mover investments and resolution of technological and market uncertainty” comes as an advantage to second movers.

“Pioneers often miss the best opportunities, which are obscured by technological and market uncertainties. In effect, early entrants may acquire the ‘wrong’ resources, which prove to be of limited value as the market evolves,” added the duo. And to talk about numbers, the fi nal nail is hammered in by Richard B. McKenzie of the University of California, who proved through an extensive study how failure rates across traditional industries for pioneers, was a 71%, with their lot controlling just a pathetic average market share of 6%.

A research by professors Markus Christen (INSEAD) and William Boulding (Duke University) also testifies thus, “We found that pioneers in consumer goods had an ROI of 3.78% lower than later entrants. And the ROI of first movers was 4.24% lower than followers in the industrial goods sector. Bottomline: Pioneers were substantially less profitable than followers over the long run…

Once upon a time, long long ago in Bethlehem, the wise men said that competition was like a 100 meter race – the first off the blocks is the one who has the biggest chance of winning the race. What they unfortunately forgot was that competition was more like a 40 kilometer marathon, where it matters more how well would you last the whole distance and learn from the mistakes of those ahead of you. Imagine driving a car at 120 miles an hour on a completely pitch dark highway in the middle of the night. Now, wouldn’t you give a king’s ransom to have another car ahead of you tasting the bumps and ditches first?

Why focus ?



Confucius says: “Man who chases two rabbits catches neither!”



“I’d rather be strong somewhere than weak everywhere”.



When managers know they have only one battle to fight it concentrates their minds wonderfully.



Companies that broaden their line, for whatever reason, are vulnerable to narrowly focused competition that takes advantage of division.



Nobody loses business just because they have a broad focus. To lose business you have to run up against a competitor with a narrow focus.



What’s needed for success is focus, which sometimes can be achieved with a full line of products, but with sacrifices' made in other areas. Distribution could be one such area. Dell Computer deselected retail distribution and direct sales force with success.



Some managers equate size with power. Is a large company more powerful than a small one? Not necessarily. A highly focused company is more powerful than a less focused company.



What provide an organization with its power is its degree of focus and its share of market. Size is only important if it contributes to an increase in market share.



Power gives a company the ability to “control” an industry, taking it in a direction that will only increase the company’s power and domination.



Wouldn’t it be easier to increase the share of a business you know than to get a share of a business you don’t know?



A focus is not forever.

At any point in time, a company has 3 kinds of products. (1) yesterdays products, which are candidates for disposal; (2) today’s products, which are producing the bulk of the company’s profits; and (3) tomorrow’s products, which are the company’s future.



Nothing stays still long enough for a company to be perfectly focused.



Sooner or later even the most powerful focus becomes obsolete. That’s when a company must refocus itself.



Focus, the future of your company depends on it.





Abstracts from: “Focus, The future of your company depends on it”, by Al Ries



If you are a BtB-unit manager and you are interested in some practical DIY-tools on strategic focus maybe you will enjouy visiting my blog: Strategy On-line



Regards

Peter